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CHAPTER 11

Concluding Thoughts: Bioethics
in the Language of the Law
Carl E. Schneider
Scarcely any political question arises in the United States
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow in their daily
controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar
to judicial proceedings .... The language of the law thus
becomes, in some measure, a vulgar tongue; the spirit of
the law, which is produced in the schools and courts of
justice, gradually penetrates beyond their walls into the
bosom of society, where it descends to the lowest classes,
so that at last the whole people contract the habits and
the tastes of the judicial magistrate.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

What happens when the language of the law becomes a vulgar tongue?
What happens, more particularly, when parties to bioethical disputes are
obliged to borrow in their daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to judicial proceedings? How suited are the habits and tastes
and thus the language of the judicial magistrate to the political, and more
particularly, the bioethical, questions of our time?
We must ask these questions because, as the incomparable Tocqueville
foresaw, it has become American practice to resolve political-and moralquestions into judicial questions. We now reverently refer to the Supreme
Court as the great arbiter of American moral life, as performing a "prophetic
function," as expressing what "we stand for as a people." Lower courts, as
L.A. Law wants to teach us, likewise are considered forums for the apotheosis of social and moral reasoning. Certainly bioethical issues in our time have
been presented to the public in legal terms, in cases ranging from Quinlan to
Cruzan to Glucksberg, in the constitutional principles of Roe v Wade, in referenda in Washington, California, Oregon, and Michigan, in the law's travails
with Jack Kevorkian, in the tribulations and trials of Baby Doe and Baby M.
Professional and public discourse about bioethics has been primarily
concerned, I think, with analyzing the moral issues each bioethical problem
presents. Law has contributed to that endeavor by generating vivid and
pressing instantiations of many of those issues, by discussing them-in
part-in moral terms, and by proffering means of resolving them. I want to
This is a slightly adapted version of an article that originally appeared in 24 Hastings
Center Report 16 (July/Aug 1994).
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explore some of these contributions. But I also want to argue that the law's
gifts should be cautiously received. For the law has goals that go beyond the
purposes of professional and public debate over bioethical issues, and those
goals peculiarly shape the moral terms the law employs and specially alter
the direction legal discourse takes.
Law is essentially a device of social regulation. This is its boon and bane
as a language of bioethics. As boon, law's attractions are two. First, it provides a highly developed, conceptually fertile, analogically abundant, carefully precise, systematically disciplined language for thinking about bioethical issues, a rich language Holmes called "the witness and external deposit
of our moral life. "1 Second, law provides a tool not just for talk, but for action. As bane, law's disadvantages are also two. First, its language is often
inapt. Second, it regularly fails to achieve its desired effect, and indeed
sometimes seems to have hardly any effect at all.
Let us begin with law's two attractions as a vehicle for considering
bioethical issues. First, because law draws on centuries of experience with
social regulation, it furnishes a highly articulated method and language for
analyzing social problems. The method, in the United States, is the common
law process. In it, courts construct legal principles incrementally, by evaluating the facts of one case at a time, and legislatures respond intermittently
with reforms and reconsiderations of their own. One might think of the common law method as Rawls's reflective equilibrium in action. It brings to bear
long-nurtured principles on emerging problems, and thus is an appealing
way of dealing with as new and febrile a field as bioethics. It is also a method
particularly congenial to medicine and applied ethics, since, like those fields,
it relies centrally on cases.
This almost-dialectical common law method has over the last millennium elaborated a language of social regulation. That language includes a
vocabulary not just of terms, but of conceptual, organizing ideas. Three sets
of ideas have formed idioms that particularly influence bioethical debate and
that will repay our attention: law's dispute-resolution function, its facilitative
function, and its rights talk.
One oflaw's oldest goals is to help resolve disputes among citizens. American law does this partly through the law of torts. When one citizen injures another, the law may-although it does not always do so-offer the remedy of a
tort suit. This is the legal remedy when one person strikes another with his fist,
runs over another with his car, sells another a defective product, or injures another in the practice of a profession. The tort action provides a means of settling the dispute between the injurer and the victim and of restoring the victim to his prior well-being. But by setting the substantive terms for resolving
disputes, tort law also establishes a standard of behavior which-one hopesmay shape future conduct so that injuries are deterred, disputes are forestalled, and, even, citizens are induced to behave better.
The language of torts provides a temptingly convenient framework for
thinking about those bioethical issues that arise where one person has in-
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jured another. In particular, tort law has in recent decades seemed a promising response where doctors have abused their power over patients. Thus,
building on tort doctrines of malpractice, the law of informed consent arose
to achieve three bioethical goals: to help resolve disputes over injuries
caused by a doctor's failure to inform a patient adequately; to provide a way,
however unsatisfactory, of recompensing the injured patient; and-more
ambitiously-to improve the way doctors in general treat their patients.
The law tries to conduce good in yet another way-through what I call
the facilitative function. The most familiar example of this function is the
law of contracts, which allows people not just to reach whatever agreements
about their affairs they themselves desire, but to deploy the law's power to
make those agreements binding and thus predictable and reliable. The facilitative function also lets individuals recruit the law's force to give binding effect to their personal preferences. Two common examples of this are the will
and the power of attorney, documents that permit people to dispose of their
property as they wish or to allocate that power to someone else.
As bioethics began to hunt for ways of enhancing the power of patients,
the idiom of the facilitative function attractively presented itself. Some people have, for example, sought to improve the relationship between doctors
and patients by analyzing it in contractual terms. (This effort has not succeeded because, I think, of a classic problem with contract law: contracts
tend to ratify preexisting differences in power.) More successful have been
analogies to the law of wills and the law of agency (the law providing for the
power of attorney). Out of those analogies have arisen the living will and the
durable power of attorney, devices that extend the authority of patients to
control their medical treatment when they can no longer think and act for
themselves.
Finally, as Cardozo said, "The great ideals of liberty and equality are
preserved against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, the scorn and derision of those
who have no patience with general principles, by enshrining them in constitutions .... "2 This process calls on the language of rights, a language that
has achieved a potence and preeminence in the United States that may be
unmatched anywhere in the world. That language is woefully marred by our
tendency to muddle moral rights, statutory rights, and constitutional rights.
(In Glucksberg, the Court held there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide, but in Oregon there is a statutory right to it in some circumstances, and
everywhere there may be a moral right.) Nevertheless, constitutional rights
are undoubtedly the trump cards of our legal system. Once recognized, they
massively prevail against statutes that infringe on them. What is more, they
have not just a legal, but also a special social and moral, authority.
Rights discourse has seemed delightfully suited to that engine ofbioethical thought, the doctrine of autonomy. Thus proponents of one set ofbioethical positions have enlisted the doctrine of constitutional rights with overwhelming effect in the law of reproduction generally and abortion specifically.
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Because the debate over that law came to be phrased in rights terms, its language, tone, content, and result have been transformed. And proponents of
another bioethical position have similarly labored, with some profit, to transpose the discourse about euthanasia into a debate over a--constitutionalright to die.
In America, then, the language of the law lies easy on the tongue. It
abounds in productive principles and illuminating analogies. It provides familiar and powerful tools for treating many social problems, including perhaps most bioethical issues. And to a truly notable extent, bioethical discourse in the United States has been phrased in legal terms, has been
conducted in courts and legislatures, and has produced legal reforms. But
alluring as the law's language may be, it carries drawbacks and limits that are
not always perceived or understood. Llke the attractions of that language,
these drawbacks arise from law's status as a means of social regulation.
First, the idioms of the law are often inapt. They have grown up in response to needs for social regulation. But the systemic imperatives that have
shaped the law are not always a good pattern for bioethical discourse. For example, the law of torts is centrally a way of compensating victims of an injury. But bioethicists, noting that tort law has some broader aims, have
hoped that the law of informed consent would not just provide a remedy
for specific failures to inform patients, but would fundamentally reform the
doctor-patient relationship. Despite its apparent appositeness, however, tort
law is poorly suited to this ambitious goal.
For one thing, the language of torts is the language of wrongs. That language states only a minimal level of duties; it is not the language of aspiration. A doctor may meet its requirements through quite mechanical and
sadly unsatisfactory routines that mock the solicitous dialogue bioethicists
imagine for doctors. Furthermore, the law (generally speaking) penalizes the
breach of even those minimal duties only sporadically-when a patient has
actually been injured by that breach (and injured enough to justify the expenses and misery of a suit). In short, for these reasons and many others, the
law of torts particularly and the law generally are not good at regulating
relationships-particularly relationships that are instinct with intimacy. The
law that tries most directly to do so-family law-is perhaps the sorriest of
law's enterprises. Thus the attempt to improve the relationship between doctor and patient through tort law may be an example of what Judith Shklar disparagingly calls "the structuring of all possible human relations into the form
of claims and counterclaims under established rules. "3
A second important drawback of analyzing bioethical problems in legal
terms is that law is a system of social regulation, a system whose parts should
mesh to form a (reasonably) coherent body of precedent and principle. Jurists have worried for centuries that changing one area will unexpectedly or
undesirably affect another area. Such concerns probably help explain the
Supreme Court's decision in Glucksberg. That case might have been decided dilferently except for Roe v Wade, 4 which is, of course, the case estab-
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lishing a constitutional right to an abortion. The Court has repeatedly reconsidered Roe, and several Justices clearly regret that the Court ever embogged itself in the jurisprudential and political quagmire of abortion and the
questions of constitutional interpretation and federalism it raises. Whatever
the moral appeal of the plaintiffs' right-to-die argument, accepting it would
have reinvigorated Roe and its controversial answers to those questions.
Thus even a Justice who found much to like in the plaintiffs' argument
might have voted against it for fear of its systemic implications. 5
This point can be put somewhat differently. Every judicial opinion looks
forward as well as backward; every opinion is both based on precedent and
itself becomes precedent. Yet a court cannot easily anticipate what kind of
precedent an opinion will become, for the cases and arguments it will govern
are cloaked in the mists of the future. The resulting apprehension about the
unforeseen consequences of each legal precedent is one reason slipperyslope arguments are so common and so convincing in law.
Accurately foreseeing consequences is particularly urgent in the context
of the "privacy" rights that are at stake in Glucksberg and Roe. To maintain the
vigor of those rights, the Court has made it structurally unlikely for a state to
justify a statute that conflicts with them. This has introduced a crucial rigidity
in the law: the Court has become reluctant to define interests as "rights" because the consequences of that decision are so severe. The more potent the
doctrine of rights, then, the more reluctant the Court must be to employ it.
That reluctance is sharpened by yet another factor: Because a system of
law demands a stable base of precedent, the Court will only rarely overrule a
decision. And the Court's constitutional decisions are virtually immune to
reversal by any other means. This increases the incentive for the Court to act
cautiously in finding new constitutional rights.
Seen in this light, Glucksberg is not hard to understand. The Court
faced several kinds of systemic pressures not to extend the privacy rights it
had announced in Roe, and it had reason to be apprehensive about the slippery slope down which it might be sliding. In addition, it was dealing with a
substantive question-euthanasia-in which the slippery-slope problem had
long been acute, as to which thinking had changed with chastening speed,
and whose future dimensions were forbiddingly murky. Thus, however the
Justices may have assessed the ethical merits of the plaintiffs' position,
whatever their views of good public policy, and however seductive the idiom
of rights, they confronted strong systemic reasons not to find a right to die.
This leads us to a third limitation of thinking about bioethical problems
in legal terms. Law is a system of social regulation, and social regulation is
the art of the possible and the necessary. Further, law is a system confided
to a specialized set of institutions with specialized capacities. For these reasons, there are often gaps in legal doctrine where those institutions have not
dealt with an issue or have lacked the capacity to do so fully.
For example, the law of rights has historically flourished in one paradigmatic situation-where a single individual confronts the power of the state.
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"'In such conflicts,"' as I once wrote, '"we are predisposed to favor the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy and human dignity.' That predisposition also rests on our assumption that the state can bear any risks of an
incorrect decision better than the individual can. "6 But bioethics abounds in
troubling situations where the conflict is not between one person and the
state, but between two people, each with a claim against the other and each
with a rights claim against the state. In these situations, our legal rights doctrine tells us little about how to choose.
Surrogate-mother contracts exemplify this problem. In the Baby M case,
did Mr. Stern have a constitutional right to father a child through such an
arrangement? Did Mrs. Whitehead have a constitutional right to raise
Melissa, the child she had borne? Did Melissa have a constitutional right to
a decision made in her best interests? Little in our blunt and limited doctrine
of constitutional rights helps answer those questions.
In sum, in investigating the first advantage oflaw as a vehicle for bioethical thought, I have observed that bioethicists and the public commonly expect
to discuss bioethical issues in primarily moral terms and, to a lesser extent, in
terms of public policy. Law provides a language that can enrich that discussion. Yet I have been suggesting courts and legislatures must also employ a
language shaped by the special exigencies of a legal system of social regulation.
We move now to study the second advantage of law as a language of
bioethical discourse. Perhaps the most delightful thing about that language
is that it is not just talk. Law is also a way of actively, directly trying to change
the world. It is not the only way, it is not always the best way, but it has conspicuous attractions.
The first of those attractions is that law embodies an already established
enforcement structure. Further, that structure is backed, ultimately, by society's fiercest instruments of coercion. For instance, the fear of criminal
prosecution even today influences-and on some views, should influencedecisions about terminating medical treatment. And anti-abortionists feel
precisely that it is wrong not to use the criminal law to prevent abortions.
But law is not just a structure of regulation backed by force. Law also
enjoys moral authority. Laws are often obeyed because people believe they
should obey the law. And people are subtly but truly influenced by the law's
expressive capacity and by the social force acquired by institutions the law
supports. This is, for instance, one defense of the law of informed consent:
even though recalcitrant doctors may evade it, it symbolizes society's aspirations for medicine. That symbol over time, and taken with other legal and social measures, may gradually prevail in the minds and methods of doctors.
These concerns may help us understand why legislatures have been reluctant to follow the logic of the principle that patients have a right to refuse
treatment toward the principle that patients have a right to the help of a doctor in committing suicide. 7 Even if legislators could see no moral difference
between dying by refusing treatment and dying by taking the pills a doctor
prescribed, legislators must worry about preserving inviolate in the public
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and medical mind the unbreachable rule: Thou shalt not kill. A rule embroidered with elaborately qualified and subtly phrased exceptions stands in
danger oflosing the moral force on which its enforcement relies.
The law is an appealing device for change for yet another reason-there
are so many points of access to it. The law can be reached through the instruments of democracy and through litigation, all means available-in principle-to anyone. This helps explain why people trying to challenge, for instance, the institutional authority of medicine and the individual power of
doctors have sought to speak in the voice of the law.
Despite these attractions, almost all laymen and too many lawyers
grossly overestimate the law's effectiveness. Why does law so often fail to
translate hopes into reality?
Once again, it is crucial that law is a system of social regulation. Bioethical reflection generally analyzes each case meticulously to produce the right
result for that case. But a system of social regulation cannot trust each decision maker to do justice in each case. Nor can it tolerate the inconsistency
and unpredictability of discretionary justice. In fact, a wisely considered and
carefully formulated rule may produce the right result in more cases than
the ad hoc efforts of individual decision makers. For all these reasons, justice
may require that an agency of social regulation write rules.
Considerations of efficiency may lead to the same result. As Whitehead
wonderfully wrote,
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by copy-books and by
eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking about what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about
them. Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battlethey are strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and
must only be made at decisive moments. 8

But of course, when you adopt a rule, you risk diminishing the chance of
doing exact justice in every case, since rules by their nature sweep many
cases under a single category. These are the problems the Washington legislature confronted in the statute tested in Glucksberg. That statute flatly forbade doctors to help their patients commit suicide. The legislature presumably calculated that allowing scope for discretion in such decisions was
likelier to result in more "errors" than the rule it adopted. Similarly, some
legislatures have concluded that a rule prohibiting surrogate-mother contracts will produce more good results than a series of discretionary decisions.
But the cost of both rules is what might be widely regarded as wrong decisions, as the stories of the plaintiffs in Glucksberg suggest.
Rules have another drawback. They must be written clearly and comprehensibly enough that the people who actually need to apply them will
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be able to do so. This problem has plagued bioethics. It has infected attempts to define death, for example. And, to take another example, doctors have not unreasonably complained that the vague "reasonable patient" standard of tort law tells them deplorably little about their duties of
informed consent.
In all these ways, then, the languages of the law have to give up something-and sometimes a great deal-in precision and in sensitivity to the
moral and social contexts in which law is actually applied. But there is a further problem. One of the great truths about law is that, with unnerving frequency, it fails to achieve the effects intended for it, and sometimes quite
fails to have any effect at all. Some of the most fascinating modern legal
scholarship reminds lawyers how removed their talk is from the world's ken.
That literature reveals that, to the lawyer's chagrin, businesses resist using
contracts, ranchers do not know what rules of liability govern damage done
by wandering cattle, suburbanites do not summon the law to resolve neighborhood disputes, engaged couples do not know the law governing how they
will own property when they marry, citizens repeatedly reject the due process protections proffered them, and, what is worse, many of these people
simply don't care what the law says.
Much the same can be said of a number of the law's recent bioethical
reforms. There is evidence that as few as 10 percent of us have made an advance directive, that as few as a quarter of us have signed an organ donor
card (despite the swarms of us avowing our desire to donate organs), that
even competent patients are not widely consulted when do-not-resuscitate
orders are written, that doctors have turned informed-consent principles
into one more bureaucratic chore, and that virtually no plaintiff wins an
informed-consent suit.
What is going on here? Well, of course, lots of things. But central among
them is the fact that the society law tries to regulate is enormously complex.
The people the law wants to affect are enticed by many incentives beyond
those the law creates. They have their own agendas and, more important,
their own normative systems. The law writes rules, but the governed often
have the incentives, time, and energy to avoid them.
Consider advance directives. They offer people a surely irresistible way
of speaking in one of life's greatest crises. Yet people spurn them. People do
so because they have their own lives to lead. Momentous as the issue may be,
it will generally not seem pressing until it arrives. People resist thinking
about their own mortality. They don't easily understand and heartily dislike
legal forms: People find them obscure and darkly imagine how they might be
misused. For that matter, people may-reasonably-doubt that they will be
used at all. Finally, many people have trouble envisioning their circumstances years into the future and how they would respond to those hypothetical circumstances. In short, advance directives were formulated and
promoted by people-bioethicists, lawyers, and doctors, for instance-who
know what they want to do through them and keenly want to do it. Much of
the public is less clear about what it wants and about whether getting it is
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worth the costs. In short, while the language of the law may have penetrated
into the bosom of society, it must still, in quotidian life, compete with the
many other languages that people speak more comfortably, more fluently,
and with more conviction.
In this chapter, I have argued that law offers a rewarding language for
treating questions of social regulation. But I have also contended that, as a
vehicle for morally consequential issues like those in bioethical disputes,
that language is momentously limited and often inapt. Law is the language
of social regulation and hence responds to systemic imperatives that are irrelevant to and even may conflict with genuine understanding and wise resolution of moral issues. This is why Holmes saw himself "as a judge whose
first business is to see that the game is played according to the rules
whether I like them or not. "9 It is why Cardozo thought the judge "is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in
the social life. "' 10
Of course courts and (much more) legislatures sometimes speak in
moral terms and always strive to write law that is consistent with moral insight. But that fact must be understood in light of law's task as a system of
social regulation: "The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by
the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to
the other without perceiving it. ... Manifestly, therefore, nothing but confusion of thought can result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral
sense are equally rights in the sense of the Constitution and the law." 11
Glucksberg does not express the Court's opinion about whether the plaintiffs
should have been helped to die. Roe does not state the Court's view of the
desirability of Texas's abortion statute. The law of informed consent does not
embody any legislature's whole understanding of the ethical duties of doctors to patients.
The law, then, has evolved to regulate social life, however awkwardly,
and its language reflects that purpose. That is its strength. But like any lexicon, law's vocabularies must be handled cautiously. For its idioms rule us in
ways we do not always grasp or desire, and they have limits growing out of
the ends for which they were created.
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